2 research outputs found
Preparing a commercial quantum key distribution system for certification against implementation loopholes
A commercial quantum key distribution (QKD) system needs to be formally
certified to enable its wide deployment. The certification should include the
system's robustness against known implementation loopholes and attacks that
exploit them. Here we ready a fiber-optic QKD system for this procedure. The
system has a prepare-and-measure scheme with decoy-state BB84 protocol,
polarisation encoding, qubit source rate of 312.5 MHz, and is manufactured by
QRate in Russia. We detail its hardware and post-processing. We analyse the
hardware for any possible implementation loopholes and discuss countermeasures.
We then amend the system design to address the highest-risk loopholes
identified. We also work out technical requirements on the certification lab
and outline its possible structure.Comment: 33 pages, 11 figures, 2 table
Protecting fiber-optic quantum key distribution sources against light-injection attacks
A well-protected and characterised source in a quantum key distribution
system is needed for its security. Unfortunately, the source is vulnerable to
light-injection attacks, such as Trojan-horse, laser-seeding, and laser-damage
attacks, in which an eavesdropper actively injects bright light to hack the
source unit. The hacking laser could be a high-power one that can modify
properties of components via the laser-damage attack and also further help the
Trojan-horse and other light-injection attacks. Here we propose a
countermeasure against the light-injection attacks, consisting of an additional
sacrificial component placed at the exit of the source. This component should
either withstand high-power incoming light while attenuating it to a safe level
that cannot modify the rest of the source, or get destroyed into a permanent
high-attenuation state that breaks up the line. We demonstrate experimentally
that off-the-shelf fiber-optic isolators and circulators have these desired
properties, at least under attack by a continuous-wave high-power laser.Comment: Abstract, Fig.5 and discussion section modified. Various minor
corrections, including clarification and explanation about the experimental
setup stability and its graphical representation; testing procedure;
configuration of QKD systems with circulators; heating of isolators; testing
results of circulators' port couples. New references added in the
bibliography. 13 pages, 6 figures, 2 table